


# BILTEK-IX

## 9th INTERNATIONAL BILTEK CONGRESS ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

May 31 - June 2, 2024 / Hakkari University- TÜRKİYE



## PROCEEDINGS BOOK

### EDITOR:

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşegül AYYILDIZ

All rights of this book belong to IKSAD Publishing

House Authors are responsible both ethically and juridically

IKSAD Publications - 2024©

Issued: 01.07.2024

ISBN: 978-625-367-752-7

# CONGRESS ID

\*\*\*

## CONFERENCE TITLE

9th INTERNATIONAL BILTEK CONGRESS ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SCIENCE,  
TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

## DATE AND PLACE

May 31 - June 2, 2024 / Hakkari University- TÜRKİYE

## ORGANIZATION

Hakkari Governorship

Hakkari University

Economic Development and Social Research Institute (IKSAD)

Hakkari Science Art Literature Association

## PARTICIPANTS COUNTRY (22 countries)

Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Malaysia, Indonesia, Morocco, Thailand, Romania, Saudi Arabia,  
Libya, Algeria, India, Egypt, Germany, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Iran, Ukraine, Spain, Portugal,  
Israel, Burkina Faso

Total Accepted Article: 246

Total Rejected Papers: 34

Accepted Article (Türkiye): 116

Accepted Article (Other Countries): 130

## **HONORARY PRESIDENTS**

Ali ÇELİK - Governor of Hakkari

Prof. Dr. Ömer PAKİŞ - Rector of Hakkari University

## **CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANIZING BOARD**

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşegül AYYILDIZ - Hakkari University

## **ORGANIZING BOARD**

Prof. Dr. Cemal ULUTAŞ - Hakkari University

Assoc. Dr. Gülistan KAYA GÖK - Hakkari University

Assoc. Dr. Halil KAMIŞLI - Hakkari University

Dr. Lecturer Member Feyat KAYA - Hakkari University

Dr. Lecturer Member Cüneyt DİNÇER - Hakkari University

Dr. Lecturer Member Arzu UÇAR - Hakkari University

Abdurrahman Asil - Hakkari University

## SCIENCE AND ADVISORY BOARD

**Prof. Dr. Adnan DİKİCİOĞLU**

*Istanbul Technical University*

**Prof. Dr. Altan ÇAKIR**

*Istanbul Technical University*

**Prof. Dr. Nihat ŞİMŞEK**

*Gaziantep University*

**Prof. Dr. Abdulhamit SİNANOĞLU**

*Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam University*

**Prof. Dr. Cenk SAYIN**

*Marmara University*

**Prof. Dr. Hacı Mehmet ŞAHİN**

*Karabuk University*

**Prof. Dr. Hülya KALAYCIOĞLU**

*Karadeniz Technical University*

**Prof. Dr. Fevzi BEDİR**

*Gebze Technical University*

**Prof. Dr. İnan GÜLER**

*Gazi University*

**Prof. Dr. Ömer YILDIRIM**

*G.O.P. university*

**Prof. Dr. Sarash KONYRBAEVA**

*Kazakh State Girls Pedagogical University*

**Prof. Dr. Ufuk Fatih KÜÇÜKALİ**

*Istanbul Aydin University*

**Assoc. Dr. Ahmet İhsan KAYA**

*Gaziantep University*

**Assoc. Dr. Ayşegül AYYILDIZ**

*Hakkari University*

**Assoc. Dr. Cihat BOYRAZ**

*Marmara University*

**Assoc. Dr. Sabahattin Çam**

*Cukurova University*

**Assoc. Dr. Dinara FARDEEVA**

*Russian Academy of Sciences*

**Assoc. Dr. İlyas KARTAL**

*Marmara University*

**Dr. Lecturer Member Alpaslan AY**

*Binali Yıldırım University*

**Dr. C. VIJAI**

*Institute of Higher Education and Research, Department of Commerce*

**Dr. Afaq SADYGOVA**

*Azerbaijan State Pedagogical University*

**Dr. Lecturer Member Rovsen Mammadov**

*Bulent Ecevit University*

**Dr. ZHI Huang**

*Minzu University of China*

**Dr.Elena TINIKOVA**

*Russian Academy of Sciences*

**Dr. MA Yuzhong**

*Renmin University*

**Dr. Elvan CAFAROV**

*Nakhchivan University*

**Dr. Beşir SALIH**

*Al Jabal Al Gharbi University*

**Dr. Hab. Elżbieta PATKOWSK**

*Lublin University of Life Sciences*

**Dr. Kazi MD. Salim Newaz**

*University of Malaya*

**Dr. Mahabbat OSPANBAEVA**

*Taraz State Pedagogical University*

**Dr. Maha Hamdan ALANAZI**

*Riyadh King Abdulaziz Institute of Technology*





## CENTRAL ASIA POLICIES OF THE GREAT POWERS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS THEY REPRESENT

### TEMSİL ETTİKLERİ ULUSLARARASI ÖRGÜTLER BAĞLAMINDA BÜYÜK GÜÇLERİN ORTA ASYA POLİTİKALARI

**Doç. Dr. Halil Emre DENİŞ**

Hakkari Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası  
İlişkiler Bölümü, Hakkari, Türkiye.

ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9830-5624>

**Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Fatih DEMİRCİOĞLU**

Hakkari Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası  
İlişkiler Bölümü, Hakkari, Türkiye.

ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7057-0795>

#### ÖZET

Bu araştırma, Orta Asya'nın jeopolitik önemi ve büyük güçlerin bölgedeki politikalarının analizini yaparken “büyük güçler” olarak nitelendirilen Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti, Rusya Federasyonu ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin öncülük ettiği uluslararası örgütlerin rolünü ele almaktadır. İlk olarak, Şangay İşbirliği Örgütü ve Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti'nin Orta Asya politikaları incelenmektedir. Çin, bu örgüt aracılığıyla Orta Asya devletleri üzerindeki etkisini artırmayı ve ekonomik çıkarlarını güvence altına almayı amaçlamaktadır. Orta Asya'nın enerji kaynaklarına erişim sağlamak ve sürdürülebilir biçimde bu anlamda çıkarlarını artırmak Çin'in bölgedeki stratejik hedeflerinden biridir. İkinci olarak, Kolektif Güvenlik Anlaşması Örgütü ve faaliyetleri bağlamında Rusya Federasyonu'nun Orta Asya politikaları ele alınmaktadır. Rusya, bu örgüt üzerinden bölgedeki askeri varlığını korumayı ve Orta Asya'yı kendi jeopolitik çıkarlarına uygun biçimde şekillendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Rusya'nın Orta Asya'daki politikaları, bölgedeki etkisini sürdürme çabalarının bir yansımasıdır. Üçüncü olarak, NATO eksenli olarak Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Orta Asya politikaları üzerinde durulmaktadır. ABD, Euro-Atlantik ortaklığın somutlaşmış hali olan NATO çatısı altında Orta Asya'da demokratik reformları teşvik etmeye ve bölgedeki istikrarı desteklemeye odaklanmaktadır. Ayrıca, bölgedeki güvenlik tehditlerine karşı NATO'nun rolünün arttırılmaya çalışması ABD'nin bölgeye yönelik önemli stratejilerinden biridir. ABD'nin Orta Asya'daki politikaları, bölgedeki demokratik değerlerin yayılmasını ve güvenlik iş birliğinin güçlendirilmesini amaçlamaktadır. Bu araştırma, büyük güçlerin Orta Asya politikalarının uluslararası örgütler aracılığıyla nasıl şekillendiğini ve bölgedeki etkilerini incelemektedir. Bu analiz, Orta Asya'daki stratejik dengenin anlaşılmasının gerekliliğine ve uluslararası iş birliğinin önemine



vurgu yapmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, her bir büyük gücün Orta Asya'daki politikalarının nasıl belirlendiği ve bölgedeki etkilerinin nasıl değerlendirildiği ele alınmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın, Orta Asya'da uluslararası ilişkiler bağlamında güç dengelerinin anlaşılmasına yeni bakış açıları sunması umulmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Orta Asya, Büyük Güçler, Uluslararası Örgütler

## ABSTRACT

This research examines the role of international organizations led by the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation and the United States, which are described as “great powers”, while analyzing the geopolitical importance of Central Asia and the policies of the great powers in the region. First, the Central Asia policies of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the People's Republic of China are examined. Through this organization, China aims to increase its influence on the Central Asian states and secure its economic interests. Providing access to the energy resources of Central Asia and increasing its interests in this sense in a sustainable manner is one of China's strategic goals in the region. Secondly, the Central Asian policies of the Russian Federation are discussed in the context of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and its activities. Through this organization, Russia aims to maintain its military presence in the region and shape Central Asia in accordance with its own geopolitical interests. Russia's policies in Central Asia are a reflection of its efforts to maintain its influence in the region. Thirdly, the focus is on the Central Asian policies of the United States with a focus on NATO. The United States focuses on promoting democratic reforms in Central Asia and supporting stability in the region under the umbrella of NATO, the embodiment of the Euro-Atlantic partnership. In addition, trying to increase the role of NATO against security threats in the region is one of the important strategies of the USA towards the region. US policies in Central Asia aim to spread democratic values in the region and strengthen security cooperation. This research examines how the Central Asian policies of the great powers are shaped through international organizations and their effects on the region. This analysis emphasizes the necessity of understanding the strategic balance in Central Asia and the importance of international cooperation. In this context, how the policies of each great power in Central Asia are determined and how their effects in the region are evaluated are discussed. It is hoped that this study will provide new perspectives on understanding the balance of power in the context of international relations in Central Asia.

**Key Words:** Central Asia, Great Powers, International Organizations



## INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-1990s, many have likened the evolving dynamics to a new Great Game, rejuvenating concepts from the late 19th century. However, while the rivalry then primarily involved Russia and the United States, today we're witnessing a three-way competition due to China's increasing significance. This study delves into the motivations and roles of the three major Powers -China, Russia, and the United States- in this contemporary rendition of the Great Game, particularly within regional security governance institutions, which is the focus of this thesis. Despite the importance of regional issues and major power interests, there's a longstanding belief that international institutions in Central Asia merely serve as extensions of these powers' interests (Contessi, 2010; Stobdan, 2008).

## CHINA'S CENTRAL ASIAN POLICY AND THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

The SCO was established in 2001, building upon the foundation of the Shanghai Five, a series of multilateral negotiations that began in April 1996. These negotiations resolved border disputes between China and Central Asian states, culminating in the signing of the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Russia, and Tajikistan. Subsequently, in April 1997, these countries also signed the Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions. The group's summit in January 2001 marked Uzbekistan's admission to the Shanghai process. In June of the same year, the six states signed the Declaration on Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This declaration formalized the birth of the organization and included the Shanghai Convention aimed at combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism, thereby defining its broad mandate.

During the 2002 Saint Petersburg summit, the leaders of member states ratified the SCO Charter and also endorsed the Agreement among SCO Member States on the Regional Antiterrorist Structure. Following this, in September 2003, Beijing hosted a gathering of heads of government from SCO member states. During this meeting, they approved the Programme of Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation among SCO Member States, outlining the primary objectives and tasks of economic collaboration within the SCO framework. This program set the direction for the unrestricted movement of goods, capital, services, and technology within the region for the next two decades. In 2004, the SCO Secretariat in Beijing and SCO Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS) were inaugurated, and during a session of the Heads of State Council in Tashkent, the Regulations on Observer Status were endorsed, granting this status to Mongolia. Subsequently, India, Iran, and Pakistan were admitted as members in 2005. The Astana summit held in the same year established a mechanism for permanent representatives of SCO member states to the RATS.



Although there are some nuances to consider, especially given the recent evolution of the organization and the respective influences of China and Russia, there's a widely accepted belief that the SCO originated from the People's Republic of China. This perception primarily arises from China's pivotal role in establishing the Shanghai Five in 1996 and subsequently founding the SCO in 2001, marking it as the first and only case thus far where China has taken the lead in creating a multilateral institution (Chung, 2006). Furthermore, China has consistently been the driving force behind the SCO, actively shaping its direction and effectively positioning itself as the primary influencer among equals (Contessi, 2010). Additionally, China's hosting of the organization's secretariat in Beijing since 2004, which was financed and provided to the SCO free of charge, underscores its significant contribution. Moreover, China appointed the organization's inaugural Secretary-General, Ambassador Zhang Deguang, for the 2004-06 term. Unsurprisingly, the SCO's development has largely aligned with Chinese preferences (Stobdan, 2008).

Several factors, in line with China's regional interests mentioned earlier, can be identified as the practical reasons behind China's engagement with and leadership within the SCO. Firstly, chronologically speaking, there was a desire to stabilize its Western border as newly independent states emerged, amid ongoing border disputes. Secondly, there was a motivation to counter any potential support to Uyghur minorities in China's Western provinces from these newly independent republics, which share similar religious and ethnic characteristics. In fact, one analyst has suggested that the SCO essentially serves as an extension of China's Western Strategy and addresses this specific concern (Contessi, 2010). Lastly, there was an aim to capitalize on economic opportunities in the former Soviet republics, particularly given their significant oil reserves (Szadziwski, 2009).

In addition to these factors, there are several geopolitical objectives that the SCO is believed to serve. Firstly, it serves as a counterbalance and opposition to the United States, particularly in response to perceived encirclement, especially in the aftermath of 9/11. In this context, Gil has noted that the Shanghai Five process commenced shortly after NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative began (Contessi, 2010). The SCO also provides a means to alleviate American pressure on its Western flank, given concerns arising from its support for Taiwan and alliances with Japan and South Korea to the East (Jing-Dong, 2005). Moreover, some analyses suggest that China aims to subtly diminish Russia's influence while enhancing its own leadership role in the region, all while recognizing Russia's distinct interests there (Huang, 2006). Lastly, the SCO offers an opportunity to establish a diplomatic foothold in a region of growing importance, facilitating connections in non-security areas and serving as a platform to advocate security policies and positions at the systemic level (Lo, 2008).

This connection is closely linked to China's adoption and advocacy of a New Security Concept (NSC), for which the SCO has been hailed as the most exemplary embodiment. It's noteworthy that the term "Shanghai Spirit," used by members themselves to describe the set of principles,



values, and norms guiding cooperation within the SCO, closely mirrors the New Security Concept. Notably, the “Shanghai Spirit” emphasizes mutual trust and benefit, equality, consultation, mutual respect for different civilizations, and common prosperity, with the explicit goal of introducing new norms to the international system (Zhuangzhi, 2004). Evidence of the New Security Concept can be discerned in various SCO and precursor institutional documents. For example, the 2000 Dushanbe Declaration of the Shanghai Five highlighted “a new security view built on mutual trust, equality, and cooperation... conducive to enhancing mutual understanding.” Similarly, the 2001 Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO included elements echoing the main principles of the NSC.

## **CENTRAL ASIA POLICY OF RUSSIA AND THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION**

The CSTO originated from the Collective Security Treaty (CST), which was signed in Tashkent within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States in May 1992. The initial signatories included Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Azerbaijan and Georgia joined the treaty in September and December 1993 respectively, with Belarus joining on December 31, 1993. The treaty came into force on April 20, 1994. However, by 1999, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan had withdrawn from the Collective Security Treaty. At the 2002 CIS Summit in Chisinau, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan established the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which was granted observer status at the UN General Assembly in December 2003. In June 2006, Uzbekistan lifted its moratorium on active participation in the CSTO and became a full member of the organization. This decision was ratified by the Uzbek Parliament on March 28, 2008.

During the October 2007 summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan hosted the 5th CSTO summit, where it was decided that member states of the CSTO could purchase Russian weapons and equipment for their armed forces and special services at prices equivalent to those within Russia. Additionally, a Memorandum on Cooperation between the CSTO and SCO was signed during this summit. The 2009 summit in Moscow finalized the agreement for the establishment of the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces. According to the CSTO Charter, the organization is governed by three permanent bodies: a Permanent Council of Envoys appointed by member states, the Joint Headquarters, which assists the Defence Ministers Council, and the Secretariat.

For most observers, it's widely acknowledged that Russia holds a dominant position within the CSTO, which is evident in its pivotal role in elevating the Collective Security Treaty into a fully-fledged international organization. Consequently, the CSTO is perceived as both an instrument and a manifestation of Russian influence (Stobdan, 2008). This perception is reinforced by several indicators, including the long-standing tenure of Nikolai Nikolayevich Bordyuzha, the organization's Secretary-General since 2003, who has close ties to Vladimir Putin. Bordyuzha's background as a former KGB senior official and his previous roles within





Russia's security apparatus underscore Russia's involvement in the CSTO. Furthermore, the fact that the organization's Secretariat is headquartered in Moscow further highlights Russia's influence (Cohen, 2006). However, it's recognized that Russia relies on extensive cooperation from its post-Soviet counterparts to uphold its previous strength and prestige. The CSTO serves as a significant platform for coordinating such cooperation, contributing to enhancing Russia's reputation as a dependable security ally, particularly following the 2007 Summit in Dushanbe, which underscored the group's growing prominence (Lo, 2008).

Some analysts perceive the affirmation of the SCO as a motivating factor behind Russia's establishment of the CSTO, which it could dominate without facing significant challenges. Another motive stemmed from disillusionment with the CIS, where several members showed a greater inclination towards NATO and expressed a desire to join the alliance (Chung, 2006). However, a central and overarching reason, influenced by perceptions of a growing American threat, motivated the establishment of the CSTO as an institution that could efficiently counterbalance US regional policies, interests, and influence (Contessi, 2010).

In addition to these geopolitical motivations, Russia also pursued other practical objectives. As previously noted, Russia was greatly concerned about the potential spillover of civil conflicts from the Caucasus and civil unrest from Central Asia onto its territory (Cohen, 2006). The formation of the CSTO and its actions can be seen as a manifestation of these concerns, exemplified by its 2010 intervention in Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, the CSTO enables Moscow to access and potentially protect its vital economic and energy assets in the region (Szadziwski, 2009). This aligns with the broader aim of maintaining a cooperative and potentially subordinate neighborhood, crucial for Russia's Eurasianist foreign policy orientation (Lo, 2008).

This aligns with the broader aim of maintaining a cooperative and potentially subordinate neighborhood, crucial for Russia's Eurasianist foreign policy orientation (Lo, 2008).

Beyond these practical and geopolitical motivations, there are also specific objectives tied to Russia's internal security and economic interests. Firstly, the CSTO plays a critical role in preventing the spread of Islamist extremism and terrorism into Russia, particularly from regions like Afghanistan. This is evident from the CSTO's focus on counter-terrorism and joint military exercises aimed at enhancing the collective capabilities of member states to address such threats (Cohen, 2006). Additionally, the CSTO helps to secure Russia's influence over the energy transit routes and resources in Central Asia, which are vital for its economic stability and leverage over European energy markets (Szadziwski, 2009).

Another key aspect of Russia's engagement with the CSTO is the reinforcement of its military-industrial complex. By providing CSTO member states with Russian weapons and military equipment at domestic prices, Russia not only strengthens the military capabilities of its allies but also ensures a steady demand for its defense industry, bolstering its economic and strategic



interests (Cohen, 2006). This military assistance further solidifies Russia's role as the primary security provider in the region, enhancing its strategic depth.

Overall, the CSTO serves multiple roles for Russia: it acts as a geopolitical counterbalance to NATO and US influence, secures Russia's borders against potential threats, ensures the stability of its regional allies, protects its economic interests, and supports its military-industrial complex. These factors collectively underscore the CSTO's importance as a tool of Russian foreign policy in maintaining and extending its influence in Central Asia and beyond.

## **THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP AND THE UNITED STATES' CENTRAL ASIA POLICY**

Since 1994, two key mechanisms have facilitated cooperation between the US and Central Asia: the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The EAPC, established in 1997, serves as an overarching forum that brings together all states participating in the PfP and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the forum it replaced, as a consultative and dialogue body. While these initiatives are not specifically tailored to Central Asia, the region emerged as a primary focus area for these programs following two rounds of expansion, particularly after the 2004 Istanbul Summit.

Furthermore, partner nations have the opportunity for consultations in case of threats to their stability or territorial integrity, elevating the program beyond a mere technical cooperation agreement and establishing it as a genuine mutual consultation pact.

The PfP underwent further expansion in 1995 with the addition of the Planning and Review Process (PARP) and a Partnership Coordination Council, both facilitating representation and collaborative planning. As outlined in the 1994 PfP Framework Document, various areas were designated for cooperation and capacity building, delivered through 'customized' Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) negotiated bilaterally between NATO and the partner nation. The establishment of the EAPC in 1997 introduced an additional platform where partner countries can engage and familiarize themselves with various NATO projects.

The EAPC meets monthly in Brussels at the ambassadorial level, and biannually at the ministerial level, involving foreign affairs and defense ministers. It operates on two fundamental principles: inclusiveness, emphasizing the openness of opportunities to all members and partners, and self-differentiation, allowing each participant to determine the extent and areas of cooperation with NATO.

The leadership of the United States in NATO's activities towards the east is evident. Throughout the debates within the alliance during the 1990s, the US consistently advocated for expanding the eastern dimension of alliance politics, often due to pressure from domestic constituencies and congressional advocates supportive of enlargement. The creation of the EAPC was largely



influenced by American strategic imperatives arising at the end of the Cold War, and according to administration sources, it continues to align with contemporary US strategy in the region.

The idea behind the Partnership for Peace (PfP) originated within the Department of Defense in 1993, primarily driven by concepts developed by Joseph Kruzel, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO. General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also played a role in its development, succeeding General Colin Powell. PfP was conceived as a provisional alternative to direct membership expansion and aimed to achieve multiple objectives for the United States. Geopolitically, it was intended to allow the US to exert influence over emerging governments, steer their security focus towards the West, thereby reducing Russian influence, and promote their integration into Western political and security structures, including potential NATO expansion. Over a decade into NATO's engagement with Central Asian Republics, one analyst remarked that "NATO's presence in the region is a strategic and geopolitical reality" (Zhuangzhi, 2004).

From a pragmatic and operational standpoint, PfP was designed as a means of socializing post-Soviet states in Central Asia gradually into Western norms and practices. At the pinnacle of the unipolar era, these norms were perceived as conducive to establishing a peaceful international order by promoting civilian oversight of armed forces, adopting Western-style civil-military relations, and spreading liberal values. This approach was viewed as a method for stabilizing a region that was highly volatile yet held significant potential. Over time, NATO's objectives in Central Asia expanded to address additional issues such as fragile states, combating organized crime and corruption, resolving conflicts in the resource-rich Caspian Sea region, ensuring human security, and addressing challenges in Afghanistan, with the aim of becoming an effective security provider.

The EAPC was designed to establish a comprehensive platform for all member states to come together. Warren Christopher, who initially proposed the EAPC in 1996, articulated his vision as follows: "We should broaden the Partnership's scope beyond its existing missions. We should engage our Partnership in both the planning and execution of NATO missions. We should empower them with a stronger voice by establishing an Atlantic Partnership Council. Through these means, NATO lays the groundwork for constructing our New Atlantic Community."

While it has been noted that PfP and EAPC serve as frameworks for cooperation and cannot be equated with multilateral bodies like OSCE or the actual NATO itself, and are unlikely to develop a distinct identity, others have contended that NATO offered the ideal structure to advance the United States' goals of outreach to post-Soviet and Central Asian regions. This is because of NATO's multilateral and collaborative nature, as well as its intangible assets such as shared norms, politico-military approaches, and established procedures refined over decades (Szadziewski, 2009).





## CONCLUSIONS

The unfolding dynamics in Central Asia resemble a modern-day rendition of the historic Great Game, but with a twist: the players have multiplied, with China joining the traditional powerhouses, Russia and the United States. As we've traversed through the intricate web of regional security governance institutions, namely the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), it's evident that each major power is strategically maneuvering to safeguard its interests while vying for influence in this critical region.

China's proactive role within the SCO, from its inception to its present-day leadership, underscores its commitment to shaping regional dynamics. Leveraging the SCO as a platform for economic cooperation and security coordination, China aims to stabilize its western border, counter potential threats from Uyghur minorities, and capitalize on economic opportunities, all while subtly balancing its relations with Russia and the United States.

Russia's central position within the CSTO is a testament to its enduring influence in the region. By transforming the Collective Security Treaty into a robust organization, Russia seeks to assert its authority, counter NATO's encroachment, and maintain stability in its sphere of influence. However, its efforts are tempered by the need for cooperation among post-Soviet states and the evolving geopolitical landscape.

The United States, through initiatives like the EAPC and PfP, aims to foster cooperation and integration with Central Asian states while advancing its strategic interests. By promoting Western norms and practices, combating regional threats, and expanding its influence, the U.S. reinforces its role as a key player in shaping the region's trajectory.

Beneath the surface of institutional frameworks lies a complex interplay of geopolitical objectives. China seeks to counterbalance U.S. influence, enhance its leadership role, and expand economic footholds. Russia maneuvers to preserve its dominance, counter NATO's encroachment, and maintain regional stability. The U.S. pursues strategic partnerships, promotes Western values, and safeguards its interests amid global competition.

As the Great Game unfolds in Central Asia, navigating its complexities requires astute diplomacy, strategic foresight, and nimble adaptation. While competition among major powers is inevitable, avenues for cooperation and mutual benefit must be explored to ensure regional stability, economic prosperity, and collective security. In this intricate geopolitical chessboard, the stakes are high, but the potential for constructive engagement remains ever-present.

In the evolving landscape of the New Great Game, the destinies of Central Asian states are intricately intertwined with the strategic calculations of major powers. As they jostle for influence and pursue divergent agendas, the future of the region hangs in the balance, shaped by the delicate interplay of competing interests, shifting alliances, and geopolitical realities.



Only time will reveal the ultimate winners and losers in this high-stakes geopolitical arena, where the echoes of history reverberate amidst the dawn of a new era.

## REFERENCES

- Contessi, N. P. (2010). China, Russia and the Leadership of the SCO: A Tacit Deal Scenario. *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, 8(4), 101-123.
- Stobdan, P. (2008). Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Challenges to China's Leadership. *Strategic Analysis*, 32(4), 527-547.
- Huang, C. H. (2006). China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Post-Summit Analysis and Implications for the United States. *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, 4(3), 15-21.
- Cohen, A. (2006). After the G-8 Summit: China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, 4(3), 51-64.
- Chung, C. P. (2006). China and the Institutionalization of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Problems of Postcommunism*, 53(5), 3-14.
- Zhuangzhi, S. (2004). New and Old Regionalism: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Sino-Central Asian Relations. *The Review of International Affairs*, 3(4), 600-612.
- Szadziwski, H. (2009). How the West Was Won: China's Expansion into Central Asia. *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, 3(2), 212-213.
- Lo, B. (2008). *Axis of Convenience. Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics*. Washington, DC: Brookings.
- Jing-Dong, Y. (2005). Chinese Perspectives and Responses to the Bush Doctrine. In M. Gurtov & P. Van Ness (Eds.), *Confronting the Bush Doctrine. Critical Views from South East Asia*. London: Routledge.